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Abstract. Failure Mode Reasoning (FMR) is a novel approach for an-
alyzing failure in a Safety Instrumented System (SIS). The method uses
an automatic analysis of an SIS program to calculate potential failures in
parts of the SIS. In this paper we use a case study from the power indus-
try to demonstrate how FMR can be utilized in conjunction with other
model-based safety analysis methods, such as HiP-HOPS and CFT, in
order to achieve comprehensive safety analysis of an SIS. In this case
study, FMR covers the failure modes of SIS inputs while HiP-HOPS and
CFT are used for modeling failure of other parts. The SIS program is
analyzed by FMR and the results are converted and transferred to HiP-
HOPS and CFT via an automated interface. The final outcome is the
collective list of SIS failure modes along with their reliability measures.
We present and review the results from both qualitative and quantitative
perspectives.
Keywords: FMR · HiP-HOPS · CFT · FTA.
1 Introduction
In the process industry, Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are mechanisms that
protect major hazard facilities against process-related accidents [5]. Failure of
SISs can result in catastrophic consequences such as loss of life and environmental
damages. An SIS consists of hardware components and a software program.
Failure Mode Reasoning (FMR) was introduced for calculating failure modes of
SIS components based on an analysis of its program [8]. Through a backward
reasoning process on the SIS program, FMR calculates the SIS input failure
modes that can result in a given undesired state at its output. Once the failure
modes are identified, the probability of failure can be calculated too.
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS)
[11] and Component Fault Trees (CFT) [9] are two model-based dependability
analysis techniques that can analyze failure modes of a system based on the
failure behavior of its components. HiP-HOPS uses the concept of failure prop-
agation and transformation between components to generate a fault tree and
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
06
27
9v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  1
1 M
ay
 20
20
2 H. Jahanian, D. Parker, M. Zeller , A. McIver, and Y. Papadopoulos
the list of failure modes, and CFT is a composition method that generates the
system level fault tree based on predefined fault tree models of its components.
Both methods generate qualitative and quantitative results.
FMR was created to address a shortcoming in safety analyses in the process
industry, whereas HiP-HOPS and CFT have been used in other sectors, such
as automotive and rail. In this paper we will combine the advantages of these
methods in a power plant application. Our objective is to show how such an
integration can improve overall safety analysis. HiP-HOPS, for instance, offers
automated synthesis and analysis of fault trees and FMEAs and state sensitive
analysis of sequences, and it is also enriched with bio-inspired algorithms [12].
However, the method still requires a first-pass manual annotation of failures,
which is a challenging task when dealing with SIS programs. Likewise, CFT can
benefit from an automated analysis of SIS programs conducted by FMR too.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an intro-
duction to the underlying concepts of FMR and SIS failure analysis. Section 3
defines the case study and the method. Section 4 outlines the process of SIS input
analysis in FMR. Sections 5 and 6 demonstrate the results of integrating FMR
with HiP-HOPS and CFT. Section 7 discusses the challenges and achievements
of the project, and section 8 wraps up the paper with a concluding note.
2 SIS and FMR
A typical SIS consists of three main subsystems: sensors that measure the pro-
cess conditions (e.g. pressure and temperature), logic solver (e.g. a CPU) that
processes the program, and final elements (e.g. valves) that isolate the plant
from a hazard when needed. The safety function achieved by a combination of
sensors, logic solver and final elements to protect against a specific hazard is
referred to as Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) [5].
As a layer of protection, the reliability of a SIF is commonly measured by its
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD): PFDSIF = PFDs+PFDls+PFDfe;
with PFDs, PFDls and PFDfe being the PFD of sensors, logic solver and
final elements respectively and PFDSIF being the aggregated PFD of SIF [5].
The PFD is calculated by using the failure rates of SIS components. A SIS
component may fail in one of the following forms: Dangerous Detected (DD),
Dangerous Undetected (DU), Safe Detected (SD) and Safe Undetected (SU) [5].
A dangerous failure is a failure that prevents SIF from responding to a demand
when a real hazard exists, and safe failure is the one that may result in a safety
action being initiated by the SIF when there is no real hazard (i.e. Spurious
Trip). The DU, DD, SU and SD elements are measured by failure rates λDU ,
λDD, λSU and λSD. For a single component, the relationship between λDU and
the average PFD is expressed by PFDavg = λDUτ/2, in which τ is the Mission
Time over which the average PFD is calculated. Other formulas are given by
various sources to relate failure rates to the PFD and Spurious Trip Rate (STR)
for general K-out-of-N (KooN) combinations [3,6,7,14].
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Well established methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [17,2] already
exist in the industry for analyzing failure. FTA is a deductive method for failure
analysis whereby a failure model, the fault tree, is analyzed to find the causes
of a given undesired event. A fault tree is a graphical representation of failure,
and it consists of events, and logical gates that interconnect those events.
The main outcome of an FTA is a set of minimal cut sets (MCS). A MCS is
the smallest conjunction of a set of basic events that, together, can lead to the
occurrence of the top event. While MCSs represent AND combinations of basic
events, a top event is simply an OR combination of MCSs. By having the failure
models of the basic events, the reliability values of basic events, MCSs and top
events can be calculated [1,14,17].
With the growing complexity of industrial systems and the availability of
technology, attention has shifted towards modularization of models and automa-
tion of methods. HiP-HOPS and CFT are two examples of modular analyses of
generic systems while FMR specializes in analyzing SIS programs.
SIS programs are typically developed in graphical editors and in the form
of Function Block Diagrams (FBD) [4]. An FBD consists of standard Func-
tion Blocks (FBs) and their interconnections – variables. As an example, y =
(x1 +x2)/2 is an average value calculation FB with output variable y and input
variables x1 and x2. FBs are fixed and known, but the function of a program
depends on the selection of its constituting FBs and the way those FBs are
interconnected. Subsequently, the failure behavior of FBs can be defined, inde-
pendently, whereas the failure behavior of the program should be identified based
on its application-specific configuration. This is the underlying idea of FMR. In
an automated process, the SIS program is scanned from its output towards its
inputs as local failure behaviors are analyzed around each FB. The results of
local analyses are then combined and simplified into a “failure modes short list.”
The same list is also used for calculating SIS reliability measures [8].
FMR is based on a failure mode calculus. A failure mode is a manner in which
the reported value of a variable in an SIS program deviates from its intended
state; with the intended state being what the variable would read if SIS inputs
were not affected by faults. Assuming that the SIS program is systematically
correct, an undesired state at SIS output can only be caused by the propagation
of input deviations through the program. FMR calculates the failure modes
corresponding to such deviations by backward analysis of the program. The
basic failure modes in FMR are expressed by h˙ and l˙ for real-valued variables,
and t˙ and f˙ for Boolean variables. Here, h˙ means high by fault, l˙ means low
by fault, t˙ means True by fault and f˙ means False by fault. The symbols are
used to express reasoning about failure modes. As an example, for the average
value FB we may say (yˆ = h˙) ⇒ (xˆ1 = h˙) ∨ (xˆ2 = h˙); meaning that output y
being too high implies that either input x1 or x2 is too high. FMR combines the
local reasoning statements like this, eliminates the intermediate variables, and
produces a final, minimal statement, comprising only SIS inputs and outputs.
4 H. Jahanian, D. Parker, M. Zeller , A. McIver, and Y. Papadopoulos
3 Definition of the case
Consider a gas-fired boiler with a high pressure drum for generating super-heat
steam. The level and pressure in the drum are measured by three level trans-
mitters and two pressure transmitters. Pressure measurement is used to modify
the level readings: drum pressure can vary between 1 and 100 bars, causing
wide-range changes to water density and thus to the level measurement. An SIS
program uses thermodynamic calculations to correct the level readings based on
pressure. Corrected level signals are compared to a preset threshold value, and if
2 out of 3 channels read extreme low, a trip is initiated at the outputs of the SIS
logic solver to close the gas valves. Failing to shut the gas burner down can result
in excessive drum pressure, boiler tube rupture, and eventually boiler explosion.
Figure 1 shows that, level transmitters L1-L3 and pressure transmitters P1-
P2 are read in through analog input modules (AIs). The output of an SIS pro-
gram is connected to gas valves via digital output modules (DOs) and interposing
relays. The gas skid consists of a main isolation valve (MGIV) and two sets of
double-block and vent valves for the main burner (MBV1, MBV2, MVV) and
ignition burner (IBV1, IBV2, IVV). During normal plant operation, the MGIV
and the block valves are open and the two vent valves are closed. If a hazardous
situation is detected, block valves will close and vent valves will open. MGIV is
not considered a safety actuator and only closes during scheduled plant outages.
Fig. 1: SIS configuration
The boiler is in its safe state (off) if at least one of the main burner block
valves and one of the ignition block valves are closed. The following key failure
states are defined:
– Dangerous Undetected failure (DU): the SIS is in a DU failure state if the
level measurement fails to detect low drum level, or if the logic solver is not
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capable of responding to a detected low drum level, or if either the main
burner valves (MBV1, MBV2) or ignition burner valves (IBV1, IBV2) are
incapable of blocking the supply gas if a demand arises.
– Spurious Trip failure (ST): the SIS will spuriously trip the boiler if MGIV,
MBV1, MBV2, IBV1 or IBV2 closes when no real hazard exists. This may
be due to a random failure of the valve itself or the upstream interposing
relays, DO modules, CPU, AI modules, or sensors.
To avoid the risk of extreme low drum level, the SIS program is designed
to initiate a trip if any 2 out of 3 combination between low level and/or sensor
fault is detected. Deviation between level signals alerts the operator but does
not initiate a trip. Furthermore, pressure sensor P1 has priority over P2: if P1
is not detected faulty, the output of the 1 out of 2 block equals P1.
Our objective in this case study is to analyze the SIF both qualitatively
and quantitatively. We would like to determine the minimum combinations of
component failures that can lead to SIS DU or ST failure. We would also like
to calculate the likelihood of individual combinations and the aggregated PFD
and STR. In the next three sections we will explain how we molded the SIS in
FMR, HiP-HOPS and CFT. Independent from our case study models, we also
developed a reference model in Isograph’s FaultTree+ tool (www.isograph.com).
The model was created to help us compare and evaluate the results of our analysis
against one same, independent reference.
4 Modeling SIS inputs in FMR
This case study is based on a medium-scale power plant project in Australia
where an SIS program performed 34 SIFs and included almost 100 hardwired
inputs, 25 hardwired outputs and 250 software signals exchanged with an opera-
tor interface. The program comprised over 2170 function blocks with thousands
of interconnections. A by-hand analysis of such programs would certainly be a
challenge. Yet, in a typical large-scale power generation unit these figures may
be five times greater, making the job almost impossible.
The input to the FMR tool is an offline copy of the entire SIS program. The
analyst does not even need to know what the SIS program consists of. They only
need to nominate a single variable in the program and the undesired state of that
variable. The tool starts at the nominated point, traces the program backwards,
and calculates the corresponding SIS input failure modes.
4.1 Qualitative analysis
In this case study we are interested in both DU and ST failure modes at the
SIF output; i.e. at the final output of the Trip Interlock block in Figure 1. The
SIS is configured in a de-energize to trip setup. That is, a False signal at the
SIF output triggers a safety action and trips the plant. Thus, DU failure occurs
when a real hazard exists but the SIF output is left True. Assuming that the SIS
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program is correct, a DU failure can only be due to the failure of SIS inputs in
detecting the hazard. ST failure, on the other hand, occurs when the SIF output
is set to False due to safe failure of SIS inputs. In the FMR terminology, we are
interested in SIF output being t˙ (for DU) and f˙ (for ST).
A copy of the SIS program was imported to FMR, and the tag number and
failure states of the SIF output were nominated. The tool analyzed the program
and generated FM (failure mode) short lists shown in Tables 1 and 2.
1 L1: healthy & higher L3: healthy & higher
2 L1: healthy & higher L2: healthy & higher
3 L2: healthy & higher L3: healthy & higher
4 L1: healthy L2: healthy P1: healthy & higher
5 L1: healthy L3: healthy P1: healthy & higher
6 L2: healthy L3: healthy P1: healthy & higher
7 L1: healthy L2: healthy P2: healthy & higher P1: faulty
8 L1: healthy L3: healthy P2: healthy & higher P1: faulty
9 L2: healthy L3: healthy P2: healthy & higher P1: faulty
Table 1: FM short list for SIF output DU failure
1 L1: healthy & lower L2: healthy & lower
2 L2: healthy & lower L3: healthy & lower
3 L1: healthy & lower L3: healthy & lower
4 L1: faulty L2: healthy & lower
5 L1: faulty L3: healthy & lower
6 L1: healthy & lower L2: faulty
7 L2: faulty L3: healthy & lower
8 L1: faulty L2: faulty
9 L2: healthy & lower L3: faulty
10 L1: healthy & lower L3: faulty
11 L1: faulty L3: faulty
12 L2: faulty L3: faulty
13 L1: healthy L2: faulty P1: healthy & lower
14 L1: healthy L3: faulty P1: healthy & lower
15 L1: faulty L2: healthy P1: healthy & lower
16 L2: healthy L3: faulty P1: healthy & lower
17 L1: healthy L2: healthy P1: healthy & lower
18 L1: faulty L3: healthy P1: healthy & lower
19 L2: faulty L3: healthy P1: healthy & lower
20 L1: healthy L3: healthy P1: healthy & lower
21 L2: healthy L3: healthy P1: healthy & lower
22 L1: healthy L2: faulty P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
23 L1: healthy L3: faulty P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
24 L1: faulty L2: healthy P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
25 L2: healthy L3: faulty P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
26 L1: healthy L2: healthy P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
27 L1: faulty L3: healthy P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
28 L2: faulty L3: healthy P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
29 L1: healthy L3: healthy P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
30 L2: healthy L3: healthy P2: healthy & lower P1: faulty
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Table 2: FM short list for SIF output ST
Each row in Tables 1 and 2 represents an AND combination of input FMs
that can result in the given output FM. A quick comparison with the description
of an SIS program we gave in Section 3 shows that FMR has identified failure
modes as expected. In analyses where unexpected FMs are detected, engineers
can use the information to correct or modify the program.
4.2 Quantitative analysis
In the second stage, FMR performs a quantitative analysis to determine the prob-
ability of occurrence of failure. The FMR tool uses its internal project database
to store failure data. In this database, each FM is described by a failure type
and a likelihood value. The failure type can be “Fixed” probability, failure-repair
“Rate” or “Dormant”. The likelihood value indicates the probability of failure
(i.e. unavailability) or the frequency of occurrence (in a time interval).
A fixed probability model is used when the occurrence of a basic event is
expressed independently from time and the repair process. The unavailability
(q) of a component with fixed probability value of p will be: q = p.
The Rate model is suitable for repairable elements. These are the components
of which the occurrence of fault is detected and for which repair and restoration
procedures are in place. The only time that the component is unavailable will
be the time that it is under repair. The time interval is known as MTTR (Mean
Time To Restoration) and the unavailability of such components will be [14]:
q(t) = λ(1− e−(λ+µ)t)/(λ+ µ) (1)
with λ being the failure rate and µ = 1/MTTR the repair rate. These rates are
often expressed per hour. For a steady-state estimation of Eq. 1, t is assigned
the constant value of Risk Assessment Time, often equal to Mission Time.
A dormant model is used when a basic event represents the undetected fault
of a component that undergoes periodic proof testing. Here we use [14]:
q = 1− (1− e−λτ )/(λτ) (2)
The failure rates and models used in this project are listed below:
– A sensor being healthy & higher (or healthy & lower): λDU = λSU =
50 FIT 4, τ = 2 years, and the event is modeled as Dormant. Reading
high (or low) values without having an indication of fault is an undetected
fault. This is why the Dormant model is selected for this type of failure.
Depending on the direction of fault, the failure mode can be considered dan-
gerous or safe. In this case study higher readings lead to DU failures and
lower readings lead to ST; due to the intended functionality of the SIF.
4 1 FIT = 1 in 109 hours
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– A sensor having a detected fault: λDD = λSD = 250 FIT , MTTR =
8 hours, and the event is modeled as failure-repair Rate.
– A sensor being healthy: q = 0.999, modeled as a Fixed probability value. It
is assumed that a transmitter is healthy for 99.9% of time.
Basic events with fixed probability values cannot be expressed in frequency
form. For the Rate and Dormant models, the frequency of a basic event will be:
w = λ(1− q) (3)
Collective calculation of probability in FMR is similar to quantitative anal-
ysis of MCSs and top events in FTA. An MCS consists of one or several basic
events, similar to one row in Tables 1 and 2. With QMCS and WMCS being the
unavailability and frequency of an MCS with n basic events:
QMCS =
n∏
i=1
qi and WMCS =
n∑
i=1
wi
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
qj (4)
The top event of a fault tree is an OR combination of its MCSs. The unavail-
ability and frequency of the top event are approximated by 5
QTE = (
c∏
i=1
qi)(1−
m∏
k=1
(1−Qk)) and WTE =
m∑
i=1
Wi
m∏
j=1
j 6=i
(1−Qj) (5)
Here, qi is the unavailability of a basic event that is common between all
MCSs, c the number of common basic events, Qk the unavailability of the kth
MCS excluding the common basic events, Qj the unavailability of the jth MCS,
Wi the frequency of the ith MCS, and m the number of constituting MCSs.
Using Eq.s 4 and 5, FMR generated the following results for our case study.
The results were verified by replicating the models in FaultTree+, which showed
no differences.
– Aggregated unavailability for DU mode: QDU = 1.31E − 03, consisting of:
• FMs in rows 1-3 of Table 1, each with QFM = 1.92E − 07.
• FMs in rows 4-6 of Table 1, each with QFM = 4.37E − 04.
• FMs in rows 7-9 of Table 1, each with QFM = 8.75E − 10.
– Aggregated frequency for ST mode: WST = 1.33E − 03 p.h., with WFM =
50 FIT for rows 17, 20 and 21 of Table 2, and WFM = 0.0 for other rows.
5 Eq. 4 is commonly referred to as Esary-Proschon method and is used by FTA tools
such as FaultTree+, Arbor and Item. See [1] for derivation of underlying concepts.
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5 Integration with HiP-HOPS
There are three phases to the analysis process in HiP-HOPS: modeling, syn-
thesis, and analysis [13]. In the manual modeling phase, a topological model of
the system is created that details the components of the system and indicates
how the components are connected together to allow the flow of data, materials,
or energy between them. Components can be grouped together hierarchically
in sub-systems to help manage the complexity and allowing for refinement of
the model as the design progresses. The components of the model are then aug-
mented with local failure behavior that defines how each component’s output can
deviate from its normal expected behavior. The failure logic further documents
how these output deviations can be caused by the combination of internal failure
modes of the component and/or the propagation of deviations of the inputs of
the component.
The second HiP-HOPS phase is the automatic synthesis of an interconnected
set of fault trees that are produced by traversing the model of the system from
its outputs to its inputs. It is during this phase that the ’mini’ fault trees defined
in the modeling phase are combined by following the connections between the
ports of the components and matching previously unrealized input deviations
with output deviations of the same class that trigger them. This results in a
model of the propagation of failure throughout the system.
The final stage is the analysis of the interconnected fault trees generated
during synthesis. This begins with a qualitative pass that contracts the fault
trees and removes the redundant logic resulting in the MCSs. The MCS are then
used together with the failure models of the components to run the quantitative
pass and produce system unavailability and failure frequency measures.
We created a HiP-HOPS model in its interface in the MATLAB environment.
The model is structured in two levels of hierarchy: system level (Figure 2a), and
component level (Figure 2b for final elements part). The DU and ST failures of
SIS are the result of failures in SIS Inputs, SIS CPU or SIS FinalElements. The
component failure modes of the latter two blocks are manually implemented in
MATLAB whereas the failure modes of the SIS Inputs block are generated in
FMR and automatically exported to a suitable data format in HiP-HOPS.
In Figure 2a, the SIS CPU block consists of two failure components: the CPU
module, and the communication link between CPU and input/output modules.
A DU (or ST) failure of either of these two components can result in the fail-
ure of SIS CPU block and thus the overall failure of SIS. The SIS FinalElement
block models the failure of DO modules, interposing relays and the valves. As
shown in detail in Figure 2b, DO1 is shared between IBV1 and MBV1, and DO2
between IBV2 and MBV2. The main gas isolation valve (MGIV) is separately
connected to DO3. The failure combinations for final elements are defined as fol-
lows: Out1.DU=(In1.DU AND In3.DU) OR (In2.DU AND In4.DU) and Out1.ST=(In1.ST
OR In.2-ST OR In3.ST OR In4.ST OR In5.ST). The analysis in HiP-HOPS produced
the MCSs for all SIS subsystems. The CPU and final elements (FE) parts shown
in Tables 3 and 4. The MCSs of inputs were the same as Tables 1 and 2.
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(a) system level
(b) final elements
Fig. 2: HiP-HOPS models in MATLAB
No. Min Cut Set Frequency
1 CPU.CPUST 5.00E-09
2 Comm.CommST 1.00E-09
3 ACTB1.ACTBST 8.00E-07
4 ACTB2.ACTBST 8.00E-07
5 ACTI1.ACTIST 8.00E-07
6 ACTI2.ACTIST 8.00E-07
7 DO1.DOST 1.00E-09
8 DO2.DOST 1.00E-09
9 DO3.DOST 1.00E-09
10 IR1.IRST 4.00E-08
11 IR2.IRST 4.00E-08
12 IR3.IRST 4.00E-08
13 IR4.IRST 4.00E-08
14 IR5.IRST 4.00E-08
15 MGIV.ACTMST 1.20E-06
Table 3: CPU and FE
MCSs for SIF ST
No. Min Cut Set Unavailability
1 CPU.CPUDU 1.90E-04
2 Comm.CommDU 1.00E-05
3 ACTB1.ACTBDU ACTB2.ACTBDU 1.70E-04
4 ACTB1.ACTBDU DO2.DODU 1.14E-07
5 ACTB1.ACTBDU IR4.IRDU 6.86E-06
6 ACTB2.ACTBDU DO1.DODU 1.14E-07
7 ACTB2.ACTBDU IR2.IRDU 6.86E-06
8 ACTI1.ACTIDU ACTI2.ACTIDU 1.70E-04
9 ACTI1.ACTIDU DO2.DODU 1.14E-07
10 ACTI1.ACTIDU IR3.IRDU 6.86E-06
11 ACTI2.ACTIDU DO1.DODU 1.14E-07
12 ACTI2.ACTIDU IR1.IRDU 6.86E-06
13 DO1.DODU DO2.DODU 7.69E-11
14 DO1.DODU IR3.IRDU 4.61E-09
15 DO1.DODU IR4.IRDU 4.61E-09
16 DO2.DODU IR1.IRDU 4.61E-09
17 DO2.DODU IR2.IRDU 4.61E-09
18 IR1.IRDU IR3.IRDU 2.77E-07
19 IR2.IRDU IR4.IRDU 2.77E-07
Table 4: CPU and FE MCSs for SIF DU
The SIS inputs failure data were transferred automatically from FMR whereas
the failure data for CPU and final elements were manually annotated in HiP-
HOPS. We used the manufacturer’s data as shown in Table 5.
Component Dormant (DU, SU), p.h. Rate (DD, SD), p.h. Fixed (PFDavg)
SIS CPU 5.00E-9 1.90E-4
SIS Comm 1.00E-9 1.00E-5
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Digital Output Module 1.00E-9 1.00E-9
Interposing Relay 6.00E-8 4.00E-8
Igniter/Burner Block Valve 1.50E-6 8.00E-7
Main Gas Valve 1.20E-6
Table 5: SIS component failure data
With the same MTTR=8 hours and Risk Assessment Time and Proof Test
Interval of 2 years, the overall model, including the imported FMR part, was
analyzed in HiP-HOPS and the following results were obtained for the overall
SIF: QDU = 1.88E − 03 and WST = 4.75E − 06.
The results generated by HiP-HOPS matched up the ones of our reference
model in FaultTree+; both at the qualitative and quantitative levels.
6 Integration with CFT
A CFT is a Boolean model associated to system development elements such
as components [9]. It has the same expressive power as classic fault trees and,
likewise, it is used to model failure behavior of safety-critical systems.
In CFTs, every component is represented by a CFT element. Each element
has its own in-ports and out-ports that are used to express propagation of failure
modes through the tree. Similar to classic fault trees, the internal failure behavior
that influences the output failure modes is modeled by Boolean gates.
The main difference between the two methods is that unlike classic fault trees,
CFTs can have multiple top events (e.g. both the DU and ST modes) within the
same model. Thus, the tree structure in CFT is extended towards a Directed
Acyclic Graph. This eliminates the need for artificial splitting of common cause
failure into multiple repeated events, and makes it possible to have more than
one path to start from the same basic event or sub-tree.
A small example of a CFT was presented in [10] (see Fig. 3). The exam-
ple shows an exemplary controller system Ctrl, including two redundant CPU s
(i.e. two instances of the same component type) and one common power supply
Sply, which would be a repeated event in traditional fault tree. The controller
is unavailable if both CPUs are in the “failed” state. The inner fault tree of the
CPU is modeled as a type. Since the CPUs are identical, they only have to be
modeled once and then instantiated twice in the main model. The failure of a
CPU can be caused by some inner basic event E1, or by an external failure which
is connected via the in-port. As both causes result in a CPU failure, they are
joined via an OR gate. The power supply module is modeled as another type.
In this example the power supply is in its “failed” state if both basic failures E1
and E2 occur. Hence, instead of a single large fault tree, the CFT model consists
of small, reusable and easy-to-review components.
Similar to HiP-HOPS, we implemented an automatic data transfer to push
the results of FMR into a suitable format in the CFT tool. The data included
the list of MCSs and the model types and failure rates of basic events. A new
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:CPU
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CPU1:CPU CPU2:CPU
≥1
Pin1
Pout1 
Controller 
failed
:Sply :Ctrl
&
E2E1
Pout1
P=0.2P=0.1
E1
P=0.3
Pout1
Sply:Sply
Fig. 3: Example of a simple CFT
add-on code was developed in the CFT tool, which imported the data in CSV
format and created the CFT element SIS Inputs. The rest of the modeling, for
CPU and final elements, was implemented manually in CFT. Figure 4 shows
the CFT model for ST failure. The highlighted box represents the SIS Inputs,
to which the FMs are automatically imported from FMR. A similar model was
implemented for DU mode.
Fig. 4: CFT model for ST failure
CFT analysis produces the same list of MCSs as in HiP-HOPS and Fault-
Tree+. Using the model types and failure rates of basic events shown in Table
6, the tool generated the following quantitative results:
– Average failure probability in DU mode QDU = 1.0E − 3
– Mean failure rate in ST mode WST = 4.61E-6 p.h.
It is apparent that the CFT results differ from what we saw in the previous
section. The main reason for this difference is that the approximation methods
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used for calculating the impact of common basic events are different in different
tools. The quantitative results presented in the previous two sections used Eq.s
4 and 5, whereas CFT is based on the Siemens’ internal tool ZUSIM, which uses
a different approach [16,15]. By changing the settings of approximation method,
in FaultTree+ for instance, we could observe narrower gaps between the results.
Basic Event DU ST
SIS CPU Probability = 1.9E-4 λ = 5.0E-9
SIS Comm Probability = 1.0E-5 λ = 1.0E-9
Digital Output Module λ = 1.0E-9 λ = 1.0E-9
Interposing Relay λ = 6.0E-8 λ = 4.0E-8
Igniter/Burner Block Valve λ = 1.5E-6 λ = 8.0E-7
Main Gas Valve λ = 1.2E-6
Input ”healthy” Probability = 0.999 Probability = 0.999
Input ”faulty” Probability = 2.0E-6 Probability = 2.0E-6
Input ”healthy & higher/lower” Probability = 4.379E-4 Probability = 4.379E-4
Table 6: Types and rates used for CFT modeling
7 Discussion
An SIS program is like the mind, with eyes and ears playing as sensors and
arms and legs as final elements. As important as an analysis of a mechanical
final element is, the overall SIS analysis cannot be complete without considering
the behavior of its commanding program. The problem, however, is that such
detailed analyses can be a painstaking, time-consuming process when done by
hand; and the results will still be susceptible to human error. Consequently,
analysts tend to leave this critical part out and instead use simplifications and
assumptions, which can lead to unreliable results.
FMR solves this problem by automating the process and by studying the
exact program that the SIS would execute. Obviously, FMR’s visibility is limited
to what influences the program. Random failure of CPU and some final elements
will still require by-hand modeling in other tools, such as HiP-HOPS or CFT.
While using additional tools may solve the coverage problem, the inconvenience
of using multiple tools with different data structures remains a problem.
In this paper we demonstrated through a case study how a comprehensive
analysis of an SIS could be facilitated by integrating FMR with other tools.
While each tool performed their own parts, the interfacing between the tools
was established through automated data conversions. The integration resulted
in reducing modeling effort as well as enhancing analysis performance. The co-
operation also led to implementing enhancements in individual tools, which can
be helpful in dealing with more complex system analyses in future.
The question FMR tries to answer is that given an abstracted state of out-
put and given the function that produces it, what are the possible (abstracted)
states of inputs to that function. This is obviously different to FTA in which
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we “know” the failure behavior of a system and we build a model (fault tree)
to summarize our understanding. However, once the FMR model is constructed,
the solving part will be similar to FTA. FMR shares another aspect with HiP-
HOPS and CFT: component-based modeling. Compared to conventional FTA,
component-based methods provide better visibility to failure behavior of sys-
tems. Traditional fault trees become visually hard to navigate as the model size
grows. Hierarchical, topographic models, such as Fig. 2, offer an easier and more
transparent understanding of the relationship between subsystems and compo-
nents at various levels, which enhances the qualitative analysis of safety systems.
Furthermore, a safety analysis can be improved by selecting the “right”
method of calculation. There are different approximation methods, referred to
by different names, including Rare Event, Inclusion-Exclusion, Esary-Proschan
and Cross-Product, depending on which the results may vary. This may in turn
lead to requiring structural changes in the SIS design, if the reliability targets
are not met [5]. Consider Table 7 as an example from FaultTree+. The results
change if we change the approximation method for our case study.
Calculation Default Esary-Proschan Rare Event
DU unavailability 1.00E-3 1.88E-3 1.88E-3
ST frequency 4.75E-6 4.75E-6 4.76E-6
Table 7: FaultTree+ calculations for different approximation methods
Among various approximation methods, we use the Esary-Proschan [1] method
for FMR, as it is more conservative than the Inclusion-Exclusion formula itself
but less of the one of Rare Event [17]. The same selection was set in HiP-HOPS
and FaultTree+ so that we could compare the results. A different approach is
used by the underlying analyzer of CFTs [16]. For the purpose of comparison, we
changed the selection in FaultTree+ to its default upper bound approximation
so we could compare and verify the CFT results.
Modeling of CPU and final elements (FE) in HiP-HOPS and CFT was done
manually. However, the effort required for modeling these parts is not comparable
to analyzing the program, which was done automatically. Our case study SIS
implemented 34 SIFs. Considering an average of 30 MCSs for each SIF (our
case study SIF had 45), the analyst would need to identify 1020 MCSs for SIS
inputs. The number of MCSs in CPU and FE parts combined was only 34, which
is almost 3% of the overall. This is because the CPU and FE parts are common
between all those 34 SIFs, and thus they are modeled once; but the inputs to
each SIF need a separate model on its own. Besides, the level of complexity in
CPU and FE failures is considerably lower than those in a program.
8 Conclusion
Through a case study we demonstrated a model-based safety analysis in which
FMR was integrated with HiP-HOPS and CFT. The purpose of this case study
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was to experience a comprehensive safety analysis in which an SIS program
is included. In this project, FMR was used to automatically analyze the SIS
input subsystem while the random failure of logic solver and final elements were
modeled in the other two tools. Add-on codes were developed in all the three
tools to enable automated data interfacing. The data interface pushed the results
of FMR analysis into the other tools where an integrated model for the entire
SIS was processed. In parallel, we created a separate model in FaultTree+, to
compare and verify the results of our own models with one same reference.
Analysis methods have their own advantages and limitations. We showed
in this paper how integrating different methods could overcome modeling chal-
lenges. The success of this project provided a platform for further inclusive safety
analyses in the process industry. Future research work will include expanding the
interfacing features of the FMR tool. In the meantime, we are in the process of
publishing a formal proof for the theoretical foundations of FMR to better sup-
port its use in safety-related analyses.
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